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Abstract. The paper examines the actual problem which is a complex and contradictory process of origin, 
formation and development of a firm and its functions. It is shown that the structure of a firm, the features of its 
organization, the nature of the functions performed and the changes occurring therein have a great influence on the 
efficiency of management, on the properties and characteristics of economic systems. It is within its framework that a 
complex process of interaction between all factors of human life activity: historical, natural, cultural, economic, 
including the basic principles and types of long-term behavior of economic agents are formed. All that has been said 
undoubtedly confirms the relevance of the topic under research. However, despite the importance of solving these 
problems, up to the present time there is no single understanding of the concept “firm”, nor a generally accepted view of 
its nature and functions. In the paper, all these issues are considered in relation to various stages of economic evolution 
and in the context of several main approaches: classical, institutional, evolutionary and behavioral, in which the 
concepts of the firm, its nature and functions are significantly different. The main directions of gradual changes in 
views on the institution of “firm” are shown: a consistent departure, and then a complete rejection of the principle of 
rationality, which was decisive at the stage of domination of the classical approach; weakening the importance of the 
theory of general equilibrium; creation of “company” models, first, describing its behavior in the real conditions of 
economic uncertainty and a disequilibrium environment, secondly, orienting in making decisions not for  the best, but 
for an acceptable result. 




A company is one of the main links of the economic system, the transformation in which affects the efficiency of 
management, the properties and characteristics of the system as a whole. A single point of view on the causes of origin, 
the content of a firm, and its functions does not exist. Representations about its purpose changed significantly as social 
and economic relations and socio-cultural environment developed. At the same time, these views played an important 
role in the formation of a stable, full-fledged and effective institution of a firm that is able to successfully resist negative 
and crisis phenomena in the economy. Especially relevant is to ensure full compliance of the firm with the goals and 
directions of industrial policy, as well as the tasks of ensuring the competitiveness of the economic system. 
Especially large changes in the content and functions of a firm take place during periods of economic transformation, as 
happened, for example, in the Russian Federation and other countries of Eastern Europe in their transition to the market 
economy. These changes were caused by numerous violations of the previously established links between individual 
elements of the economic system, including the most significant of them which determine the type of economic 
disequilibrium that has developed at the moment. These include the interaction between organizational forms of 
production, the relationship between personal and material factors, the regional and branch structure of the economy, 
and the structure of investment. 
These violations are inevitably accompanied by changes in the position of a firm in the system of economic relations 
and its functions, as well as by the growth of all types of their costs: production, transaction, and dissipative. This, in 
turn, complicates the functioning of the economic system due to the impossibility of timely receipt of undistorted 
management and price signals into its subsystems and to individual economic entities. 
The result of changes in the transforming economy is the redistribution of product releases between individual firms and 
companies. In this case, unlike the conditions of the usual market system, where it would have occurred in favor of the 
most effective actors, in a transforming economy everything takes place in another way. This circumstance makes it 
necessary to investigate the development of the concept “firm” content and functions of a firm, taking into account 
economic disequilibrium. 
2. METHODS 
The following methods were used by authors in the work: 
1) Historical, in accordance with which the content and functions of a firm were examined at various stages of their 
economic evolution, which made it possible to trace the temporal sequence and features of the emergence and 
development of their main elements and forms; 
2) Comparative analysis method, through the prism of which the features of the concept “firm” content and functions of 
a firm were analyzed in the context of economic transformation and the accompanying pronounced economic 
disequilibrium; 
3) Abstract-logical method, which is the main tool of economic modeling and scientific analysis, that made it possible 




3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
One of the first attempts to understand the causes and conditions of origin of a firm, the variety of their sizes 
and types belongs to A. Smith, who identified the development of trade as such, as well as the scale of demand. A firm 
seemed to him as a way of production, which provides technical progress and an increase in labor productivity, 
illustrating this statement using the example of a pin factory [1]. 
In principle, A. Smith believed that a firm emerges and operates in a competitive market environment, which 
allows it to find and use equilibrium prices. Although competition was considered by him only as perfect one, and 
according to him, any role of the state in regulating the activities of firms should be completely denied. In fact, this was 
the principle “the lesser is the state influence, the better”. A. Smith believed that the purpose of a firm is achievement of 
maximum efficiency of management, what corresponds to a strictly rational type of behavior of economic entities. 
Smith's approach was later developed in the works of A. Marshall, J. Robinson, J. Schumpeter, and others. 
Thus, A. Marshall supplemented and developed the idea of a firm as an organization, one of which functions is 
to ensure economies of scale, and thus he explained the formation of large economic structures. A. Marshall approached 
to the problem of formation of an equilibrium price in a different way. He showed that equilibrium is not a frozen, static 
state, but only a moment in a continuous development, which is both the final stage in the process of adaptation to 
changed conditions, and the starting state for a new process. In addition, A. Marshall essentially considered for the first 
time the interaction between firms in conditions of disequilibrium, using a special method for this purpose. He 
introduced the concepts of short-term and long-term periods and showed that the transition from one state  of 
equilibrium to another is not instantaneous, but only through successive discontinuous iterations [2, 3]. This allowed A. 
Marshall firstly to look at the problem of the general economic equilibrium developed by L. Valras, according to whom 
it should be considered unattainable. Secondly, to show that after a violation of an equilibrium state, the economic 
system can never again come to a new state which is the same as the previous one. And thus, A. Marshall has rejected 
the main thesis of the theory that economic evolution is an endless process of successive movement from one state of 
equilibrium to another. This state proved to be an exception to the rule rather than a stable state to which the market 
mechanism automatically leads. 
A significant contribution to the improvement of the theory of a firm was made by J. Robinson. Considering 
the behavior of firms and the development of their functions under conditions of imperfect competition, and in fact in 
conditions of disequilibrium, he revealed new characteristics and factors of their behavior, for example, competition 
between manufacturers of differentiated products, price discrimination, etc. J. Robinson also drew attention to the 
possibility of a multiplicity of equilibrium states, showing that the market system functions in reality in more complex 
way than it was previously thought [4]. 
New provisions concerning the theory of a firm were proposed by J. Schumpeter, who developed the theory of 
an entrepreneurial firm, which he understood as a special economic agent not aimed at maximizing profit or utility, as 
opposed to other concepts, but at forming strategic advantages in competition [5]. 
A new approach to the analysis of the content and functions of a firm was proposed by R. Coase, who used as 
the theoretical basis not the theory of general equilibrium, but the institutional concept, according to which a firm is no 
longer an integral organic element of the market, but, on the contrary, contrasted to it being a domestic production 
opposing to an external one. According to R. Coase, who viewed a firm as a system of relations, where the resources are 
completely dependent on the entrepreneur, its formation is associated with special transaction costs, and a firm itself is 
created in order to minimize them. 
In addition, on the basis of the institutional approach, it was found that although a firm is created to minimize 
transaction costs, they are never completely destroyed because of the asymmetry of information. This means that one 
can judge the degree of economic disequilibrium by their magnitude. 
A new and important step in deepening the understanding of a firm and its functions was made within the 
institutional framework by M. Jensen, W. Mekling and especially O. Williamson, who presented a firm as a set of long- 
term agreements or a "network of contracts" between economic agents specifying rights and obligations of parties [7]. 
According to this point of view, if the contracts were always perfect, that is, they could provide for any possible 
complications in relations between agents, a firm would not be needed. But since such contracts are not possible in 
principle, they all do not exclude opportunistic behavior of partners; hence the understanding of a firm arises as a 
network of such long-term contracts each of which is best suited to the specifics of a particular relevant transaction. The 
functions of a firm are presented here as an opportunity to choose such an optimal contract form that ensures maximum 
savings on transaction costs. 
Another important step in developing an understanding of a company operating under conditions of a 
disequilibrium environment was made within the framework of evolutionary and behavioral theories, where the very 
understanding of a firm and its functions is fundamentally different from traditional ones. 
So, in the first of them a firm is regarded as an almost complete analogue of a living organism, which 
continuously develops reacting to any changes in the external environment and, in turn, changing the rules of its 
behavior and thereby achieving effective results [8]. R. Nelson and S. Winter created a number of models describing the 
reaction of firms to changes occurring in the environment, for example, to the growth of investment, to rising prices, to 
structural and technological shifts in other industries. With the help of these models, they showed that such a reaction is 
really a reciprocal change by firms of the principles and norms of their behavior that were formed earlier on the basis of 
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a competitive struggle directly depends. 
It follows from the foregoing that the process of the evolution of firms can be considered and represented as a 
continuous and consistent change in their behavioral characteristics or routines in interaction with the external 














Fig.1. The evolution of a company from the standpoint of evolutionary theory 
 
In the figure, we see that the routines that govern the short-term behavior of a firm determine the volume of 
output and costs. Taking into account the conditions of demand, supply and prices, this volume determines the amount 
of profit. The level of profit through another set of routines that control long-term behavior, i.e. with the help of 
investment rules, set the scale of production. The latter, in turn, determining the level of output and costs, affects these 
characteristics of a firm through a third set of routines aimed at finding the most useful rules and rules. Thus, the 
development of a firm is carried out through the process of continuous interaction, search and selection of routines and 
their adaptation to the constantly changing environmental conditions. 
The given model of firm evolution differs radically from models based on the concept of general equilibrium, 
including due to complete lack of even the concept of maximizing efficiency. According to its ideas, the maximization 
of results does not occur at all in the process of evolution, but simply the search for the best option of management from 
all possible ones applicable only to these specific conditions. This option is usually far from the equilibrium and 
optimal. This approach to the evolution problems made it possible to take a completely new look at the established 
concepts and categories of traditional economic theory, and in essence opened up for the research and analysis in 
general not previously considered problems. 
It should be noted that evolutionary selection illustrated by the example of only individual firms, is also 
implemented in economic systems of a more complex level of regions, industries, and the economy as a whole. 
However, here, for example, at the sectoral level, it consists not only in selecting the most useful routines for a firm, but 
also in the formation of new ones through the gradual extraction of them from a set of repetitive, analogous situations, 
and, in addition, the selection of firms themselves, the result of which is change in the industry structure. The process of 
development and selection is endless, and therefore it cannot be asserted that at some point the best industry structure 
was established, the most sophisticated routines were selected or the most effective firms were selected. 
Thus, we see that with regard to the industry, as with the individual firm, from the point of view of  
evolutionary theory, too, it makes no sense to talk about any maximization of efficiency. It is only possible to find the 
best solution possible in the given circumstances. 
The ideas of the evolutionary theory are echoed by the views of behavioral theory, where research and analysis 
of a real decision-making process taking place in households, firms and organizations are also at the forefront, and with 
this in mind a generalized new model of behavior of economic agents in a disequilibrium environment is constructed [9; 
10]. 
Among those basic provisions, there is an assertion that the decisions made by business entities are not based 
on the principle of rationality. In fact, they obey the generally accepted rules and conventions. An economic agent, 
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unlike neoclassical notions, seeks not to maximize utility or profit, but to find a satisfactory option for it and when the 
first more or less acceptable result is reached, the search for new options ceases. 
The acceptability or non-acceptability of the option is determined only by the subject itself, and is related to its level of 
claims, which correspond to its personal perceptions of what it should and can count on. If the result of economic 
activity is negative, then the level of personal claims is reduced, since the subject begins to treat its capabilities more 
critically. If the result is successful, then the level of claims is increased, and a new and higher goal is put in this case. 
Strictly speaking, the considered model of behavior is based on a personal intuition of the head of the firm and does not 
allow making reliable unambiguous predictions. And nevertheless, it is closer to the real decision-making process in 
comparison with the concept of equilibrium. It is also confirmed by economic practice, which provides many relevant 
testimonies. Following the rules a firm makes only a satisfactory choice, because in the conditions of uncertainty of the 
disequilibrium environment, it is still impossible to calculate everything in advance, it often gets better results than in 
cases of attempts to optimize firm’s activity. Most firms tend to prefer to adhere to these same rules, even when a 
deviation from their original position might be more beneficial than upon compliance with it. 
4. SUMMARY 
On the basis of the study, we can draw some conclusions: 
1. A firm which is an independent primary economic link, has, as its functions, a complex content that 
continuously develops in time and reflects in itself all the numerous changes that are happening objectively in economic 
systems in the course of their evolution. Therefore, it cannot be fully described by the means of any one approach or by 
one model. 
2. Each of the approaches, theories and concepts that in their own way define the essence and content of firms 
and explain their behavior and functions, has its strictly limited scope depending on the conditions and circumstances in 
which firms operate. Thus, situations close to equilibrium can be described with sufficient reliability even today by the 
production function, and situations characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and incompleteness of information are 
models of institutional, behavioral or evolutionary approaches. 
3. The general trend in the development of the theory of a firm and its analytical tools is for today the 
growing interest in the apparatus of evolutionary and behavioral theory that are more adequate to today's economic 
realities. 
5. CONCLUSIONS. In conclusion, we note that the analysis of evolutionary changes in the content and 
functions of a firm, their description, modeling and forecasting of development are most difficult to apply to a 
transforming economy where different types of economic disequilibrium collide simultaneously, and firms interact 
under conditions of transition from one of them to another, being simultaneously influenced by restrictions of  a 
different nature. Therefore, it is impossible to satisfactorily describe their behavior using a single model. This imposes 
particularly stringent requirements on the analysis of the problem of the formation and development of the modern 
institute of the company in transformational systems. It should be implemented on the basis of an integrated system 
approach, taking into account the positive experience of other countries. 
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